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ABSTRACT
THE RESPONSE OF TL INTERBANK RATES TO WEEKLY MONEY SUPPLY 
ANNOUNCEMENTS WITHIN THE FRAMEWORK OF MARKET EFFICIENCY
In th is  s tudy ,the  e ffects of weekly money supp ly  
announcements on changes in TL in te rbank rates is tested in 
terms of market e ffic iency . As a re su lt o f the model tested, 
T u rk ish  in te rbank market appeared to be an ine ffic ien t 
financ ia i market. During th is  s tudy, ARIMA based generated 
money supp iy  su rvey  data is used. Therefore a jo in t 
hypothesis, market e ffic iency  and e ffectiveness of ARIMA based 
su rve y  data, is tested. Th is leads to a weak rejection of 
market e ffic iency  in TL in terbank market.
Key words: Money supp iy  annoucements, in te rbank rates, 
antic ipated component of money supp ly  announcement, 
unantic ipated component of money supp ly  announcement, market 
e ffic iency  hypothesis.
ÖZET
FINANSAL PİYASALARIN VERİMLİLİĞİ ÇERÇEVESİNDE HAFTALIK PARA 
STOKU DUYURULARIN BANKALARARASI TL PARA PİYASASI FAİZ
h a d l e r in e  e t k i s i
Bu çalışmada, para stoku d u yu ru la r in in  bankalar arasi 
TL para p iyasasi fa iz had lerine olan e tk is i finansal 
m arketlerin  ve rim liliğ i hipotezi a ltinda  test ed ilm iştir. 
Sonuç o larak banka lararasi TL para p iyasas in in  ve rim liliğ i red 
ed ilm iştir. Bu calismada, zaman se r ile r i metoduyla para stoku 
tahm in leri hesaplanm ış ve modelde para stoku anket ve ris i 
o larak ku llan ilm is tir . Bu durumda finansa l m arketlerin  
ve rim liliğ i ve para stoku anke tie rin in  ARIMA tabanli tahmin 
sonu c la r iy ia  gösterim in in e tken iig i b ir lik te  test ed ilm iştir. 
Bu bağlamda, bu calismanin kapsam inda banka lararasi TL para 
p iyasas in i ve r im liliğ i hipotezi za y if şnlamda red ed ilm iştir.
Anahtar keiim.eier: Para stoku anonsl^ni, banka iararasi 
para p iyasasi fâ i? hadleri, beklenen para stoku, beklenmeyen 
0ara stoku, m arketlerin  ve rim liliğ i h ipotezi.
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INiTRobUCTION
The purpose of th is  s tudy  is to model and examine the 
e ffects o f money supp ly  announcements on T.L. In terbank rates 
w ithin the framework of market e ffic iency . In recent years the 
e ffects of money supp ly  announcements on in te rest rates have been 
stud ied extensive ly . It is w idely accepted that the announcement 
of an unexpectedly large growth in the money supp ly  leads to an 
immediate increase in sho rt term in te rest rates. Several
a lte rna tive  theories in the ex isting  empirical lite ra tu re  have
been constructed to explain th is  relation. In th is  study , ra ther I 
focus on market e ffic iency  concept, s ince it will be in te resting  
to examine th is  concept w ith in the cond itions of a newly emerging 
financia l market, such as the In terbank market in Tu rkey.
In the f ir s t  section, a su rve y  of the conceptual basis of 
the s tudy  will be presented.Second section includes a su rvey  of 
the empirical lite ra tu re , about the e ffects  o f money supp ly  
announcements on financia l asset markets. Th is p rov ides the 
theoretica l background of my s tudy  and g ives a broader view on 
areas of fu r th e r  research. Th ird  section in troduces the empirical 
work.In section fou r the model is presented and the expected 
re su lts  are pointed in econometric terms. Section f iv e  summarizes 
the empirical f in d in g s  and g ives in te rp re ta tion  on these resu lts. 
The last section includes conclusion of the study.
I. CONCEPTUAL BASIS :
1.1) In terbank Market in General
In th is  market banks borrow and lend excess reserves, 
balances held by bank at the Central Bank in excess of those 
requ ired , to each other.
In terbank funds  are a d ire c t claim to a deposit at the 
Central Bank tha t is they are fund s  held fo r member banks in the 
Central Bank tha t can be used to sa tis fy  reserve  requirements.
Most sa les o f funds are made on an ove rn igh t basis, but 
there  are longer m aturities. O vern igh t transactions in th is  market 
p rov ide  the pu rchasing  bank with a cheap source of money and a 
convenient way to make sizeab le day to day adjustm ents in its 
reserves. For the se lling  bank, the funds  sold prov ide  a 
conven ient form of liq u id ity , s ince  it has the f le x ib ility  to 
ad ju st to da ily  sw ings that o ccu r in its  reserve  positions.
Four types of banks deal in th is  market. F irs t  there  are 
se lle rs . These are the smaller suburban  banks that p rim arily  deal 
with correspondents. When they have an excess balance at hand, 
usua lly  deposit at th e ir  correspondent bank, they ask th e ir  
correspondent to buy them. The correspondents usua lly  do by the 
fund s  as a se rv ice  to th e ir  customers. Because of the passive 
nature of th is  purchase, the buy ing banks are re fe rred  to as 
"in term ed iaries". Interm ediaries genera lly  ca rry  a de fic it balance 
in th e ir  reserve  accounts equal to the amount of funds they 
expect to purchase from th e ir  customer banks. If the amount 
received is g rea ter than expected, the interm ediaries put out the
d iffe rence  to th e ir  own correspondent banks.
The buyers  are p rim ariiy  those banks that active iy  search 
out fo r these fund s  as a permanent source of funds and ca rry  iarge 
de fic it positions in th e ir  purchases of funds. These banks have 
the puise of the market and basica iiy  determ ine the rate at which 
funds are traded.
The last group is designated as balancers o r a rb itrage rs . 
A ithough these banks are of medium s ize  to large, they do not 
operate in great voiumes in th is  market o r conduct a large enough 
correspondent business to generate su ff ic ie n t funds to be 
considered as interm ediaries. However th e ir  management is 
soph isticated enough to t ig h t ly  contro l th e ir  reserve  position 
da ily  so tha t they can play on both sides of the market as 
a rb itrage rs(The  Money Market, Marcia, Stigum).
The in te rbank rate is set by supp ly  and demand cond itions 
that ex ist in the market. However the most important facto r in the 
market as a whole is the Central Bank itse lf. Through the way it 
conducts its  open market operations, the Central Bank can fa ir ly  
accurate ly  contro l the excess reserves in the banking system in 
Turkey.
In conducting  open market operations, the Central Bank aims 
at con tro lling  the in te rbank rate because the rate p iays a very  
important role in the sho rt term operating procedures that the 
Centrai Bank follows to achieve its  longer term ob jectives  o f 
monetary contro l and economic stim ulus. Therefore, banks must 
follow ve ry  c lose ly  what Centra l Bank is doing with respect to the 
in te rbank rate and t ry  to an tic ipa te  its  actions in o rde r to 
foresee the d irection  in which the rate can be expected to move in
the fu tu re .
1.2) Money Supp ly  Announcements
The e ffect of money on the ex ante real in te rest rate is an 
issue tha t has attracted attentions of economists fo r decades. 
There is a debate in th is  area since the empirical stud ies 
designed to measure the impact of monetary policy on the real rate 
are inconclusive . The reason is that; money, p rices and in te rest 
rates as well as Centra l Bank policy are all endogenous variab les 
and th is  fact prec ludes formation of an appropria te  s tru c tu ra l 
model that is acceptable fo r all researchers . In th is  respect, 
money supp ly  announcement comes to the p icture . Money supp ly  
announcements present a un ique oppo rtun ity  fo r researchers since 
they are abso lute ly  exogenous variab les un like  the actual money 
supp ly . On each thu rsday  afternoon money supp ly  f ig u re  is 
announced by the Central Bank. At the time it is announced, the 
reported f ig u re  does not depend on the Central Bank policy, asset 
prices, or in fla tion . Th is means tha t if s ig n if ican t co rre la tions
are found between money supp ly  announcements and changes in
in terbank rates and ove r asset p rices, the causal relation must 
run from the announcement to asset p rices  ra ther than vice versa. 
Indeed w ith in the concept of Rational Expectations the 
unantic ipated weekly change In M1. may be in terpre ted as an 
exogenous variab le , that causes financ ia l va riab les to change
afte r the announcements of Ml (Cornell, 1983). Moreover, by
working with MSA (Money Supp ly  Announcements) ra ther than actual 
money supp ly  the observation in te rva l is g rea tly  reduced. The long 
observation in te rva l is necessary to produce re liab le  estimates of
the expected and unexpected change in money. Whereas the 
observation in te rva l o f from 2 hours to 1 trad ing  day at most is 
requ ired  to s tudy  the e ffects o f money supp ly  announcements on 
in te rest rates.
Announcement phenomenon is important and must be stud ied at 
th is  point. Announcements cause no change in the quan tity  of 
money, the on ly th ing  that changes with announcement is the 
information set o f pub lic  and so are th e ir  antic ipations.
The article^ w ritten by Nicholas, Small and Webster proposes 
that a complete ana lys is  of the announcement e ffect must examine 
the link  between information and in te rest rates as well as that 
between money and in te rest rates. S ince in te rest rates change in 
accordance with the announcements and the money supp ly  does not, 
the new information in the announcement must cause money demand to 
change through antic ipation mechanism o f people. Th is concept 
b r in g s  us to concept o f market e ffic iency.
1 O.A. Nichols, D.H. Small, C.E. Webster "Why Interest Rates Rise 
When an Unexpectedly Large Money Stock is Announced"(1983)
1.3) Market E ffic iehcy  Hypothesis
E ffic ien t market theory is essentia ily  a subset of the 
rational expectations theory. The rational expectations states 
that, in a com petitive world, economic agents wiii expio it aii 
ava iiab ie  information to take advantage of any perceived p ro fit 
opportun ities. Rationai Expectations Hypothesis impiies that 
agents do not make system atic m istakes in forecasting  the fu tu re  
and tha t the d r ive  fo r p ro fit wiii tend to elim inate any obvious 
oppo rtun it ie s  fo r abnormai gain. Ind iv idua i hoid rationai
expectations with respect to a va riab ie  if h is pred iction  is the 
same as the va riab ie ’s mathematicai expected vaiue, conditionai on 
an information set contain ing aii pub lic ly  availab le information. 
Market e ffic iency  hypothesis as a natura l extension of Rational 
Expectation Hypothesis, states tha t p rices in a market fu lly  
re fle ct all ava ilab le  information.
While investiga ting  the re lation between money supp ly  
announcements and in terbank rates the constra in ts  imposed by 
market e ffic iency  should not be ignored s ince financia l markets 
d isp lay rational expectations. The evidence supporting  market 
e ffic iency  is qu ite strong and recent work ind icates that a 
fa ilu re  to impose financ ia l market e ffic iency  can lead to 
m isleading resu lts .
The term "e ffic iency" re fe rs  to how successfu l the market is
in estab lish ing  new prices, success being defined in terms of
whether the market incorpora tes all new information related with 
p rices  in a rapid and unbiased manner. The p rice  mentioned w ithin 
the framework of th is  s tudy  is the p rice  o f money, i.e. in terbank
rates. E ffic iency  the re fo re  re fe rs  to the two aspects,the speed 
and qua lity , o f adjustm ent to new information, which in our case 
is the money supp ly  announcement. Obviously; if the market were 
de fic ien t in terms of the speed o r qua lity  of its  reaction, the 
informed and a le rt ob se rve r would have litt le  d iff icu lty  In 
p ro fit in g  from the s ituation, i.e a rb itrag ing .
In the lite ra tu re , a d is tin ction  is made between three 
potential leve ls of e ffic iency, each level re lating to a spec if ic  
set of Information which is in creas ing ly  more comprehensive than 
the p rev ious one.
a) Weak E ffic iency
The market is e ff ic ien t in the weak sense if p rices fu lly  
re fle ct the information implied by all p r io r  p rice  movements. 
P rice  movements in e ffect are to ta lly  Independent of p rev ious 
movements, impling the absence of any p rice  put te rns. P rices 
would respond on ly to new information o r to new economic events.
b) Semi strong  E ffic iency
The market is e ff ic ien t in the semi strong sense if p rices  
respond instantaneously and w ithout bias to newly published 
information, whether o r not the wars of information m ight d iffe r  
amongst themselves about the s ign ificance  of new data, the 
implication is that the p rices  tha t are actua lly  a rr ived  at in 
such a market would in va riab ly  represen t the best Interpretation 
of information.
c) s trong  E ffic iency
The market is e ffic ien t in the strong sense if p rices fu lly  
re flect not on ly published information but all re levant in 
information inc lud ing  data not yet pub lic ly  available. If the 
market were s trong ly  e ffic ien t, therefore, even an in s ider would 
not be able to p ro fit from his p riv ileged  position.
These three  leve ls are not independent of each other. For 
the market to be e ffic ien t in the semi strong  sense it must also 
be e ffic ien t in the weak sense.
The empirical resu lts  ind icate that the weekly money supp ly  
announcements do in fact contain information. Thus the 
informational content of money supp ly  announcements must be 
investigated to understand the an tic ipa tions of economic agents 
about in te rest rates and e ffic iency  of in te rbank market (which is 
re levant fo r the determ ination of in te rest rates).
The ra tiona lity  o f expectations does not preclude the 
po ss ib ility  tha t the monetary au tho rity  may t ry  to "fool" the 
market to ca rry  out some economic ob jective . It on ly implies that 
the market forms unbiased expectations of economic variab les. 
However, th is  implies that the market would u tilize  any 
information contained in se r ia lly  corre lated fo recast e rro rs . Thus 
the market would learn and respond to any system atic policy 
action. Thus the e ffect of the su rp r is e  component on in te rest 
rates should re fle ct the system ’s techn iques of operation (or 
policy ru le) in implementing monetary policy. "Rational" response 
of in te rest rates to the monetary announcements is taken in the 
sense o f co rre c tly  incorpora ting  the po licy ru le  in operation.
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Institu tiona l s tru c tu re  and sequence of events su rround ing  
announcement procedure is useful to c la r ify  information processing 
and antic ipation  mechanism of economic agents partic ipa ting  in 
in terbank market.
II. LITERATURE SURVEY
In recent years, the e ffect of money supp ly  announcement on 
in te rest rates has been stud ied e x ten s iv e ly  (Cornell 1979, 1983, 
U rich and Watchell, 1981, 1984, Roley 1983, Grossman 1981). The 
impact of unantic ipated movements in money on stock re tu rn s  
(Pearce and Roley 1983, 1985 and Lynge 1981) and on fore ign  
exchange rates has also been investigated (Hardouvelis 1984, 
Cornell 1982, Engel and F rienke l 1984). Generally these stud ies 
find  tha t the anticipated component of money supp ly  announcement 
has no e ffect on capita l market p rices. On the other hand, 
unantic ipated changes in money generate an in te rest rate response 
in the same d irection  that is both s ig n if ican t and prompt. 
Add itiona lly  s igna lling  models have been advanced in the 
lite ra tu re  to explain the reaction of in te rest rates to money 
announcement su rp r ise s  (Cornell 1983,Siegel 1985 and Nicholas, 
Small and Webster 1983). In C o rne ll’ s case, money su rp r ise s  are a 
s ignal about fu tu re  real a c t iv ity . In S iege l’s model, the 
announced money supp ly  revea ls information about both the cu rren t 
and fu tu re  states of real economic a c t iv ity . Nicholas, Small and 
Webster argue tha t when announced money exceed expectations, th is  
is a s igna l tha t fu tu re  money demand will- be h igher, th is  being 
the case they argue that in te rest rates wUt |ijjpp in response, if
investo rs  believe that the shock to money demand will d iss ipate  
more slow ly than an equally large shock to money supp ly .
The paper published by Co rne ll (1983) namely "The Money 
Supp ly  Announcement Puzzle;Review and In terp re ta tion" presents on 
exce llent review and summary of ex isting  theories. Generally I 
re fe rred  to tha t a rt ic le  while p repa ring  the lite ra tu re  su rvey  
section.
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1) The Expected Infla tion Hypothesis:
The most obv ious lin k  between money announcements and short 
term in te rest rates is th rough expected infiation. The hypothesis 
is tha t announcement of an unanticipated jump in the money stock 
ieads to expectations of h igher in fiation and thus to an increase 
in in te rest rates, while announcement of an unanticipated drop in 
money has the reverse  effect. One requirem ent of the expected 
in fla tion approach is tha t p rices respond qu ick ly  to changes in 
money. If p rices take several months to respond, th e ir  rational 
agents would not a lte r then sho rt run in fla tion forecasts on the 
basis of a money supp ly  announcements and rates of re tu rn  on sho rt 
term assets like  trea su ry  b ills  would not be affected. Because of 
its  ve ry  sho rt term nature, o ve rn igh t in terbank rate is almost 
ce rta in ly  unaffected by in fla tionary  expectation. Indeed th is  
issue was em pirica lly  tested by T .U rich  and P.Watchell(1984) and 
they argue tha t on ly po licy an tic ipa tions resulted from money 
supp ly  announcements are e ffe ctive  on the change in in terbank 
rates and no s ig n if ican t relation is found between in fia tionary  
expectations (announcements of consumer and producer p rice  index) 
and change in in te rest rates. Severa l empirical s tud ies were
The effects of Inflation and Money Supply announcements on
Interest Rates"(1984)
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conducted to examine the e ffects of money supp ly  announcements and 
asset markets. To summarize, the expected in flation hypothesis 
p red ic ts  tha t in response to an unexpected Increase 
in the money supp ly  :(i) short-te rm  in te rest rates will rise, 
(ii) long term rates will rise, but the increase will be less than 
sho rt term rates un less the expected in fla tion  changes
permanently; ( ill) the domestic cu rren cy  will depreciate aga inst 
o ther major cu rren c ie s  (iv) Stock p rices  may move up or down 
depending on the role of taxes, nominal con tracting  by firm s and 
o ther m arkets ’ imperfections.
2) Keynesian Hypothesis:
A second link  between money and asset p rices in th rough the 
expected real rate. For th is  lin k  to work, it must f ir s t  be the 
case that actual innovations in money a ffect the ex ante real 
rate. I t ’s the Keynesian liq u id ity  preference model with s ticky  
p rices  that posits such a re lation.
M
Money market equ ilib rium  condition - - p —  = f(y ,i)
M = The nominal stock of money 
P = P rice  level 
Y = The level o f income
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In Keynesian world p rices do not ad ju st instantaneously to 
monetary shocks. For th is  reason in te rest rate must ad ju st to 
b ring  the money supp ly  and demand into equ ilib rium . A sudden 
increase in the supp ly  of nominal money balances causes real money 
balances to r ise  because p rices are s lugg ish . To c lear money 
market, the in te rest rate must fa ll to produce an o ffse tting  
increase in money demand. S ince expected inflation will rise, the 
decline in the nominal rate must be due to a drop in the ex ante 
real rate. However th is  liq u id ity  e ffect is a sho rt run
phenomenon. The in te rest rate s ta rts  to re tu rn  to its  in itia l 
level as soon as p rices begin to ad just. When the adjustment of 
p rices is complete, the in te rest rate is back at its  s ta rting  
point.
I f actual changes in money affect the ex ante real rate, 
then announced changes will also have an impact if they a lte r 
an tic ipa tions regard ing  fu tu re  monetary au tho rity  policy. The most 
common approach is to assume tha t the cen tra l bank attempts to 
contro l the growth rate of monetary aggregates. In th is  context, 
an unexpected Jump in money stock leads market pa rtic ipan ts  to 
believe that the Central Bank will have to tighten c red it to 
o ffse t to rise. Because agents antic ipate  that fu tu re  tigh ten ing  
will lead to h igher rates v ia  the liq u id ity  effect, they bid 
agg re ss ive ly  fo r funds and d r ive  up cu rre n t in te rest rate. U rich 
and Watchell(1984) re fe r to th is  scenario  as the policy 
antic ipation e ffect and t r y  to make a d iscrim ination between 
po licy an tic ipa tions and expected in fla tion  hypothesis.
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If the policy antic ipation e ffect is correct, money supp ly  
announcements should have a d iffe ren t impact on sho rt term 
in te rest rates compared to long term in te rest rates. There are two 
possib le cases. In the f ir s t  instance, the anticipated period of 
monetary re s tra in t is expected to be sho rtlived . In that case, 
on ly  the spot rate and nearby forward rates are affected. On the 
o ther hand, if the anticipated period of monetary re s tra in t is 
expected to be prolonged, d is tan t forward rates, and hence 
longterm rates will fa ll. The drop occu rs because the liq u id ity  
e ffect is sho rt iived and because a prolonged period of monetary 
re s tra in t will eventua lly  reduce expected inflation. 
Hardouvelis (1984) re lates the duration of expectation of monetary 
re s tra in t policy to the c re d ib ility  of monetary au thority  among 
pub lic . Th is empirical study conducted by him concludes that 
market pa rtic ipan t in USA believes the c re d ib ility  of Fed in the 
sho rtrun  but remains susp ic ious on seriousness of Fed’s monetary 
targets. The policy antic ipation hypothesis p red ic ts  a d iffe ren t 
d irection  in fo re ign  exchange markets from that of in fla tionary  
expectations hypothesis. This p rov ides a tool fo r testing  those 
two hypothesis. Accord ing to policy antic ipation  hypothesis a rise  
in the ex ante real rate will cause the domestic cu rren cy  to 
appreciate. As Dornbush (1976) and Engel and F ran ke l* f1984)
)|c G.A. Hardouvelis, "Market Perceptions of Federal Reserve Policy 
and The Weekly Monetary Announcements"
C.Engel , J.Frankel "Why Interest Rates Reacts to Money Su 
Supply Announcements:An Explanation from the Foreign Exchange 
market
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describe, the market perce ives the change in the money stock as a 
tra n s ito ry  fluctuation  that monetary au tho rity  will reverse  in the 
fu tu re  so tha t anticipated fu tu re  tigh ten ing  ra ises today ’s real
in te rest rate, causes a capita l inflow and apprecia tes the
domestic cu rren cy . On the other hand, an increase in the ex ante 
real rate produced by monetary re s tra in t should lead to lower 
stock prices. F irs t  the d iscount rate rises to re fle ct the h igher 
real rate. Secondly, expected corporate  cash flow will decline if 
agents believe that an increase in the real rate depresses
economic a c tiv ity .
In summary, the Keynesian hypothesis p red ic ts  that in
response to announcement of an unexpected increase in the money 
supp ly : I) Short-term  in te rest rates will rise, ii) long-term
in te rest rates will e ither decline o r remain la rge ly  unaffected 
depending on whether the period o f fu tu re  monetary re s tra in t is 
seen as being permanent o r tran s ito ry , iii) The domestic cu rrency  
will apprecia te  aga inst o ther major cu rren c ie s  and iv) stock 
p rices will decline.
15
III. CASE STUDY: REPUBLIC OF TURKEY 
III.1) TL In terbank Market In Turkey
Until mid e ighties, the Tu rk ish  Central Bank did not control 
money stock s t r ic t ly  fo r monetary policy purposes. Economic policy 
in general and monetary policy in p a rticu la r were not based on the 
be lie f that the money stock had s ig n if ican t in fluence on e ither 
p rices o r output. A major constra in t on the Central Bank’s 
behavior has been the ob ligation to finance the government’s 
borrow ing requirements. S ince v ir tu a lly  no attention had been paid 
to money stock, an expansion in domestic c red it to government 
sector had not been encountered by any s ig n if ican t squeeze of 
p r iva te  sector c red it t il l mid e ighties. From that time an Central 
Bank has put monetary policy in action and tr ied  to constru ct 
monetary po licy tools to contro l monetary aggregates. For that 
reason Central Bank constructed the In terbank market on Apr 2nd, 
1986. and started  to open market operations on Feb 4th, 1987. Its 
ta rge t has become res tr ic t ion  of near money aggregate, which is Ml 
while w idening less liqu id  money supp ly , M2. Among open market 
operations, reverse  repo has been the most frequen tly  applied tool 
o f Central Bank in o rde r to reduce liq u id ity  in the market.
In terbank market was constructed to enhance the reserve  
movements among the banks and make better u tiliza tion  of our 
banking system. In terbank rate is mainly an ind ica tor of liq u id ity  
level in the market. On the m aturity  days o f governments bonds in 
domestic market; on the partic ipa tion  days o f severa l funds and 
m unicipals into the in terbank market, on the day that T reasury
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pays its  debt to Ziraat Bankasi etc. the market is h igh iy  liqu id  
so in te rbank rate goes down. Whereas on the wage payment days, on 
the days that bank have to deposit reserve  requirem ents to 
Central Bank, ju s t before the re lig ious festiva ls , on taxation 
days etc. there  is tigh ten ing  in the liq u id ity  so in terbank rate 
increases.
Development of in te rbank market can be d iv ided into three 
periods. Before feb 29 1988, the in terbank rates were determined 
by the free  market conditions. Between feb 29 and march 21 1988 
Central Bank applied upper and lower lim its on the in terbank rates 
to p reven t excessive increase or decrease in rates in case of 
imbalances between supp ly  and demand fo r reserves in the market. 
A fte r march 21, 1988 Central Bank insta lled two sided quotation 
system among banks in the market besides the old one.
These periods were reflected in the in terbank rates. For 
example, before feb 29, 1988 s ince rates were formed under free  
market cond itions a rate about 60% m ight mean a high in terbank 
r a te . po inting to t igh tness of liq u id ity  while the same fig u re  
m ight mean a low in terbank rate with the in troduction  of
quotations a fte r feb 29.
TL in terbank market beg ins tran saction s about 10 am and ends 
transactions about 4 pm on each day. Central Bank exerts
substan tia l power on in terbank market and keeps th is  market as a 
tool of ach iev ing  its  monetary po licy ends. Central Bank enters
the market as a buyer o r se lle r of reserves accord ing to the
d irection  of its  monetary policy and makes huge volume of 
transactions. At the early  days of the market. Central Bank used 
it fo r con tro lling  the spread between o ffic ia l and free  exchange
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rates. A fte r the construction  of fo re ign  exchange in terbank market 
in 1987, tha t function  was tran s fe rred  to th is  new market. A study 
conducted by U..Erol and M.AItinkemer showed tha t creation of 
fo re ign  exchange in terbank market eiim inated the need to use 
in te rbank rates as a tooi to s tab ilize  exchange rate margin 
especia lly  beg inn ing from 1989. However, Central Bank continues to 
use TL in te rbank market d ire c tly  from time to time fo r the sake of 
its  po licy. In tervention  of Central Bank and s t r ic t  margin of 
movements on in te rbank rates h igh ly  reduces the movement of that 
market free ly .
III.2) Money Supp ly  Announcement
T u rk ish  Central Bank pub lishes "Money and C red it S ta tis t ics" 
in "Weekly Bu lletin  of Central Bank of T u rk ish  Republic" at every 
thu rsday  in a limited number (around 130). These issues are sent 
to sen io r management of all banks and top managers of government 
agencies. As soon as the bu lle tin s  are reproduced in requ ired 
number, they are availab le fo r users. Central Bank organ izes the 
d is tr ib u tion  of these issues accord ing  to the preferences of users. 
(Immediate users take the issue d ire c t ly  from Central Bank while 
o the rs may p re fe r mail). The reproduction  of issues is completed 
around 2 pm to 4 pm. Moreover the same s ta tis t ic s  are included in 
the "Weekly P ress Bu lle tin ", which is also d is tr ibu ted  together 
with the"W eekly Bu lletin  of TC Centra l Bank", then p ress makes 
these data pub lic ly  known.
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Central Bank uses lagged reserve  accounting system sim ilar 
to that of USA. The data covers the week ending th irteen  days 
before the thu rsday  announcement, in o ther words it belongs to the 
week that is two two weeks before the announcement. This is 
pa rtia lly  caused by the d if f ic u lty  of obta in ing the requ ired 
s ta t is t ic s  from banks on time.
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IV. MODEL
Th is section presents the emprical model to be tested to 
determ ine the e ffic iency  of Tu rk ish  in terbank market. F irs t  the 
s tru c tu ra l model is given and then the data are described.
IV.1) S tru c tu ra l Model
/
In the p rev ious sections, the Market E ffic iency  Hypothesis 
with respect to money supp ly  announcements and Interbank rates Is 
d iscussed in detail As a summary, In an e ffic ien t in terbank 
market, in te rbank rate should a lready embed the anticipated part 
of announced Ml and only the unanticipated, or the su rp rise , part 
should have an e ffect th rough the rev is ion  of market pa rtic ip an ts ’ 
antic ipations. If the announced Ml is not s u rp r is in g ly  d iffe ren t 
from that in fe rred  by the pa rtic ipan ts  there is no need to rev ise  
fu tu re  policy ru le  anticipated and change the cu rre n t behaviour.
Reffering to Miskin*(1982), the theory of rational 
expectations (or, equ iva lan tly  e ff ic ien t markets theory) ind icates 
that in te rest rates in a bond market should re flect all ava ilab le 
Information. Market uses availab le Information co rre c tly  in 
assesing the p robab ility  d is tr ibu tion  of all fu tu re  Interest 
rates.
 ^ F.S. Miskin "Monetary Policy and Short-Term Interest Rates: An
Efficient Markets-Rational Expectations Approach"
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EmC-t '  ‘ t- l>  = E (r , /  I^_,)
= In te rest rate at time t 
I _^^= Information availab le  at time t-1 
E ) = The expectation conditional on I
E^(.../I^_  ^ ) = The m arket’s expectations
(unbiased forecast) assessed at t-1 
Denoting the market’s one period ahead fo recast of the 
sho rtra te  as r® (=E^ (r^ /
E (r^ -  r^ /  I^_ )^ = 0
The above equation states that the fo recast e rro r  fo r sho rt 
rates should be uncorre lated with any linear combinations of 
information in An equ iva len t representation of the rational
expectations model which sa tis fie s  above requirem ents is
-  r® = (X  ^ -  X® ) + t
X^  = Variab le  of information re levant to the
determ ination of shortterm  in te rest rates. 
X®= M arket’s expectations conditional on past 
information about X .^
= A Coeffic ient vector 
.= Se ria lly  uncorre lated e rro r  process
Th is model s tresses tha t an unanticipated change in the 
sho rt rate will o ccu r on ly when unantic ipated information h its the 
market. In o rde r to make the model em pirica lly  testable, M ishkin
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in troduces one-period-ahead forward rates into the model. 
Considering in terbank market, the d ifference in in terbank rates 
ju s t before to ju s t a fte r the announcement shows the revision of 
market antic ipation on in terbank rate related to the information 
embedded in money supp ly  announcements on thu rsday.
The regression  equation to be tested in th is  model is
r^ -  r^ = ag + *  Ml® + a2 *  (M1^ -  M 1^
r^ = In terbank rate a fte r the announcement
D
r  ^ = In terbank rate before the announcement
M1^= Actual money supp ly , M1 announced.
M1^= Antic ipated money supp ly . Ml forecasted.
With a more compact representation
= ag + a^  * (M1FRC)  ^ + a2 * (MISURP)^
The money supp ly  announcements are decomposed into 
anticipated and unanticipated components to test the e ffic ien t 
market hypothesis that only the unantic ipated components should 
a ffect rates.
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M1FRC is the series of anticipated money supp iy .
M1SURP is the series of unanticipated supp ly  
Our null hypothesis pointing e ffic iency  of TL interbank 
market are a^  = 0 and a.^   ^ s ta tis t ica lly .
As suggested by Grossman(1981), the e ffect of M1SURP on 
changes in in te renst rate should reflect, under rational 
expectations, the anticipated policy response to the monetary 
su rp rise . S ince the Central Bank has essentia lly  no informational 
advantage over the pub lic  with respect to weekly changes in M1, it 
reacts to the incoming monetary data a fte r they have been released 
to the pub lic. It is th is  possib le reaction by the Central Bank to 
the unanticipated change in M1 unanticipated by both Central Bank 
and the pub lic  tha t tr ig g e rs  the rates response. These are the 
expected resu lts  under ra tiona lity  of markets.
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IV.2) Data
The exogenous variab le  in my study is the money supp ly  
announcements of narrow ly defined money supp ly , M1. It shows the 
liq u id ity  in the market s ince it inc ludes cu rren cy  and near money 
aggregates. Centra l Bank revised the defin ition  of Ml and the 
mentions it in tab les as "new narrow defin ition  of money supp ly ". 
M1 inc ludes the fo llow ing
. Cu rrency  in C ircu la tion  
. Demand Deposits
. Commercial Account 
. Saving Account 
. Deposits Held at Central Bank
My data period covers 238 weekly data from JAN 8th 1988 to 
JU L  24 1992. These are presented in Table IV.2.1.
Money Supp ly  Anticipation data is not read ily  availab le as a 
su rvey  resu lt. In USA, Money Market Se rv ices  Inc. obta ins 
fo recasts of the change in narrow ly defined money supp ly  by 
question ing with about 50 government secu rit ie s  dealers on weekly 
telephone su rveys . As a resu lt of h is empirical study on su rvey  
expectations, Grossman(1981) pointed out that the su rvey  
expectations e ffic ien tly  utilize  all the information in a time 
serie s  model and In addition contain autonomous (nonextrapolative) 
information. Unfortunate ly  there is not such a su rvey  se rv ice  in 
Tu rkey . Th is se rie s  was estimated using time series ana lys is  
approach. In th is  study the f ir s t  51 observations on Ml 
announcements were taken as a basis fo r constructing  s tru c tu ra l
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ARIMA model. The f ir s t  d ifference series of announcements was 
generated to get a sta tionary  series. Autocorre lations fo r 25 lags 
and partia l autocorre la tions fo r 18 lags were examined and among 
severai a lte rna tive  models tested the appropria te  model was found 
to be ARIMA (3,1,2). The resu lts  g iven at Appendix A.
A fte r determ in ing the s tru c tu ra i model, ite ra tive  time 
series method was applied to ARIMA (3,1,2) model to generate 
anticipated money supp ly  series. Th is method proceeded as follows: 
in o rde r to fo rècast the anticipated value fo r a spec ific  wëek all 
the p rev ious ly  announced Ml values were taken to information bdsfe 
to rev ise  ARIMA (3,2,1) coeffic ients. The anticipated value was 
forecasted with these revised coeffic ien ts in the presence of last 
observation added. The fo recasts generated with th is  method is 
tabulated in Table IV.2.2.
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TABLE IV.2.1 
WEEKLY MONEY SUPPLY ANNOUNCEMENTS ( TL IN BILLIONS )
Week
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8 
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20 
21 
22
23
24
25
26
27
28
29
30
31
32
Ml
4
,1
9
,2
6
2
2
1
6770, 
6997 
6864. 
6711 
6507, 
6449 
6684. 
6454. 
6428
6438.7
6788.5
6809.3 
6473.9
6581.3
7081.2
6990.1
6885.8
6642.8
6750.5
7244.9
7120.8
6974.1
6902.4
7297.3
7301.4
7094.6
7144.9 
8029. 
8228. 
8220. 
8188,
1
7
7
2
8237.5
Week
33
34
35
36
37
38
39
40
41
42
43
44
45
46
47
48
49
50
51
52
53
54
55
56
57
58
59
60 
61 
62
63
64
Ml
8442.6
8356.4 
8359.9
8505.1
9194.6
8941.5
8753.5
8861.6 
9208
8874.1
8541.5
8264.5 
8504.4
8740.3
8697.3
8527.6
8646.8
9111.9
9044.8
11243.8
9340.8
9242.4
9517.4
9377.2
9419.6
9640.8
10217.9
10019.7 
10033.5
10356.7 
11067.4 
10807.2
65
66
67
68
69
70
71
72
73
74
75
76
77
78
79
80 
81 
82
83
84
85
86
87
88
89
90
91
92
93
94
95
96
Week Ml
10590.1
10760.4
10913.3
11231.7
11613.3
11745.5
11732.9
12234.9 
11903
11963.6
12153.4 
12813
12548.1
12784.3
13070.6
14494.3
14113.2
14175.5 
14232
14607.4
15410.9
14984.3
14971.5
15138.4
16373.5 
16099
16310.6
16235.8
16271.9
17346.1 
17092
16786.1
Week
97
98
99 
100 
101 
102
103
104
105
106
107
108
109
110 
111 
112
113
114
115
116
117
118
119
120 
121 
122
123
124
125
126
127
128
16896.3
17785.1
17225.2
17175.1
17227.3
18445.8
18073.8
20358.3
18641.2
18426.3
19308.2
18480.3
18347.6
18197
19231
18632.5
18573
18512
19951
19614
19521
19632
19872
22139
21963
21133
21292
22500
21566
21557
21963
23556
Ml
WEEKLY MONEY SUPPLY ANNOUNCEMENTS
TAB L E  I V . 2.1 (CONTINUED)
( TL IN BILLIONS )
Week
129
130
131
132
133
134
135
136
137
138
139
140
141
142
143
144
145
146
147
148
149
150
151
152
153
154
155
156
157
158
159
160 
161
Ml
22979
24653
24845
24059
25240
24679
24771
25341
27104
26472
26238
26050
26712
26978
26842
26470
26809
27810
26819
26488
26955
28192
26939
26389
26365
26563
27240
29326
29013
28066
30507
29533
29227
Week
162
163
164
165
166
167
168
169
170
171
172
173
174
175176
177
178
179
180 
181 
182
183
184
185
186
187
188
189
190
191
192
193
194
Ml
28792
30543
29434
29314
2813730185
29490
28570
28188
32310
31204
29549
28776
29440
31368
30314
30088
30502
31419
34904
33419
31812
32579
34362
33445
34078
34585
38174
36357
35822
36401
37455
39974
Week
195
196
197
198
199
200 
201 
202
203
204
205
206
207
208209
210 
211 
212
213
214
215
216
217
218
219
220 
221 
222
223
224
225
226 
227
Ml
39430
39127
40148
42534
40500
39353
38843
42459
39676
39038
38675
39598
41872
42116
42533
39883
43395
41401
39675
40316
42362
43350
41902
43803
43572
46656
43716
46054
44057
48118
46124
46888
44585
Week
228
229
230
231
232
233
234
235
236
237
238
Ml
49705
46469
46807
50075
57525
53434
50955
49436
49062
56269
54219
TABLE IV.2.2
ANTICIPATED MONEY SUPPLY (MIFRC)
Week MIFRC Week MIFRC Week MIFRC
52 8789.585 84 14499.25
53 11070.03 85 14678.65
54 11105.64 86 15146.48
55 9668.046 87 15005.91
56 10268.66 88 15139.62
57 9623.745 89 15418.21
58 9612.197 90 16087.49
59 9708.686 91 15930.49
60 10010.88 92 16213.65
61 9984.911 93 16597.76
62 10041.13 94 16572.38
63 10255.42 95 17100.88
64 10736.17 96 16993.38
65 10721.83 97 16939.84
66 10709.09 98 17262.15
67 10890.67 99 17807.34
68 10990.14 100 17316.41
69 11159.44 101 17253.49
70 11420.56 102 17577.04
71 11593.23 103 18277.53
72 11702.08 104 17986.78
73 12100.16 105 19262.42
74 12017.46 106 19446.5
75 12095.43 107 18833.76
76 12241.97 108 19652.47
77 12626.4 109 19060.6
78 12558.99 110 18648.32
79 12760.56 111 18514.56
80 13033.23 112 19046
81 13985.63 113 18860.31
82 13975.73 114 18766.58
83 14172.27 115 18879.65
116
117
118
119
120 
121 
122
123
124
125
126
127
128
129
130
131
132
133
134
135
136
137
138
139
140
141
142
143
144
145
146
147
19645.51
19535.69
19549.42
19971.16
20098.46 
21089.65
21497.47 
21390.09
22000.36
22611.67 
21694.78
21588.16
22239.37 
23094.71 
22759.64
23877.7
24916.68 
24483.91 
25229.32 
25003.13
24891
25324.45
26429.48 
26434.96 
26575.88 
26721.63 
26853.18 
26863.21 
26888.07 
26934.57
27162.1
27604.77
TAB L E  IV . 2.2 (CONTINUED)
ANTICIPATED MONEY SUPPLY (MIFRC)
Week MIFRC Week MIFRC Week MIFRC
148
149
150
151
152
153
154
155
156
157
158
159
160 
161 
162
163
164
165
166
167
168
169
170
171
172
173
174
175
176
177
178
179
27073.39
26987.65
27397.68
27840.67 
27123.58
27043.66
27260.6
26851.56 
26837.75
28469.04
28592.68 
28345.84
30254.43 
29580.22
29545.12 
29640.94 
30168.82
29684.14
29676.14 
29340.45
29788.01
29661.09 
28966.64 
29322.28 
30822.38 
30343.26
29984.09 
31093.31
29948.1
30572.49
29980.08
30371.56
180
181
182
183
184
185
186
187
188
189
190
191
192
193
194
195
196
197
198
199
200 
201 
202
203
204
205
206
207
208
209
210 
211
31210.43
31106.92
32916.5
32691.86
32456.56 
33996.75
34246.13
32892.87 
33914.47 
34808.36 
36670.17
35821.05 
36070.81 
37659.97
37246.16 
38242.41 
38604.52
39347.43 
40794.34
41781
40248.04
40257.15
40815.74
41904.69
39473.93
39366.9
40869.65
40135.17
40216.74 
40879.3
42256.7
41427.38
212
213
214
215
216
217
218
219
220 
221 
222
223
224
225
226
227
228
229
230
231
232
233
234
235
236
237
238
239
43232.32
42275.51
40121.35
41547.44
42306.21
41884.09
41601.08 
43953.81 
44122.59 
44956.83
44249.3
45553.02 
45971.62 
46067.41
46800.12 
46064.77 
46981.92 
47869.85
47736.13 
45736.34
50240
52734.31
51647.94
51970.98
54631.66
50107.05
54264.4
52923.08
I obtained da ily  transaction  weighted average settlements of 
in te rbank rates covering  Jan 1989 to Ju l 1992. The change in 
In terbank rate from ju s t before to Just a fte r the announcements is 
my endogenous variab le . S ince the hourly  in terbank rates are not 
obta inable w ith in a day from Centra l Bank (even closing and 
beg inn ing rates), I took the d iffe rence  between Thursday 
(announcement day) average and F riday  average to re flect the 
impact of announcement on in te rest rates. The data on in terbank 
rates are presented in Table IV.2.3.
M1SURP is unanticipated that is the su rp r ise  component of M l.
MISURP^ = Act.MI^ -  MIFRC^ (Antic ipated)
The M1SURP series is g iven at Table IV.2.4.
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TABLE IV.2.3
Interbank Changes in 
Rates Interbank 
Rates
Weekly Ml 
Announc.
thursday 30 11243.8
fr iday 34.04 4.04
thursday 25 9340.8
fr iday 21.19 -3.81
t hursday 43.41 9242.4
fr iday 92.22 48.81
thursday 75 9517.4
fr iday 40 -35
thursday 29.84 9377.2
fr iday 33.47 3.63
thursday 35 9419.6
fr iday 33.06 -1.94
thursday 25 9640.8
fr iday 29.23 4.23
thursday 42.19 10217.9
fr iday 40 -2.19
thursday 25.34 10019.7
fr iday 25.8 0.46
thursday 35 10033.5
fr iday 36.93 1.93
thursday 20.22 10356.7
fr iday 31.88 11.66
thursday 53.22 11067.4
fr iday 73.95 20.73
thursday 43.16 10807.2
fr iday 45.09 1.93
thursday 40.07 10590.1
fr iday 40.11 0.04
thursday 35.25 10760.4
fr iday 31.94 -3.31
thursday 37.28 10913.3
fr iday 60.05 22.77
thursday 30.28 11231.7
fr iday 28.36 -1.92
TABLE IV. 2.3
Interbank
Rates
(CONTINUED)
Changes in 
Interbank 
Rates
Weekly Ml 
Announc.
thursday 28.11 11613.3
£r iday 42.55 14.44
thursday 88.15 11745.5
fr iday 92.09 3.94
t hursday 73.29 11732.9
triday 87.76 14.47
t hursday 32.71 12234.9
fr iday 25 -7.71
t hursday 35 11903
fr iday 39.52 4.52
thursday 91.87 11963.6
fr iday 82.06 -9.81
thursday 37.54 12153.4
fr iday 41.63 4.09
thursday 38.38 12813
fr iday 40 1.62
thursday 45 12548.1
fr iday 40 -5
thursday 36.34 12784.3
fr iday 40 3.66
thursday 41.96 13070.6
triday 50 8.04
thursday 89.88 14494.3
triday 76.39 -13.49
thursday 39.05 14113.2
triday 32.67 -6.38
thursday 33.58 14175.5
triday 33.68 0.1
thursday 41.03 14232
triday 40 -1.03
thursday 30.25 14607.4
triday 31 0.75
TAB L E  IV.2.3 (CONTINUED)
Interbank Changes in 
Rates Interbank 
Rates
Weekly Ml 
Announc.
thursday 49.23 15410.9
£r iday 57.04 7.81
t hursday 43 14984.3
fr iday 48.62 5.62
t hursday 55 14971.5
fr iday 55.42 0.42
t hursday 21.71 15138.4
£r iday 16.28 -5.43
t hursday 34.78 16373.5
fr iday 42.61 7.83
thursday 45.37 16099
fr iday 39.8 -5.57
thursday 21.48 16310.6
fr iday 20.45 -1.03
thursday 15.18 16235.8
fr iday 11.61 -3.57
t hursday 17.14 16271.9
fr iday 36.28 19.14
thursday 18.61 17346.1
£r iday 15.18 -3.43
t hursday 20.19 17092
£r iday 20.17 -0.02
thursday 25.36 16786.1
£r iday 26.77 1.41
thursday 54.23 16896.3
£r iday 48.87 -5.36
thursday 54.84 17785.1
£r iday 53.44 -1.4
thursday 42 17225.2
£r iday 43.27 1.27
thursday 26.2 17175.1
£r iday 27.97 1.77
t hursday 29.74 17227.3
TABLE IV. 2.3
Int erbank 
Rates
(CONTINUED)
Changes in 
Interbank 
Rates
Weekly Ml 
Announc.
fr iday 29.76 0.02
t hursday 22.35 18445.8
fr iday 25.23 2.88
t hursday 23.34 18073.8
£r iday 23.14 -0.2
thursday 23.16 20358.3
fr iday 28.17 5.01
thursday 22.09 18641.2
£r iday 24.02 1.93
thursday 37.78 18426.3
£r iday 39.92 2.14
t hursday 48.81 19308.2
£r iday 43.29 -5.62
t hursday 21.21 18480.3
£r iday 20.2 -1.01
t hursday 33.24 18347.6
£r iday 38.88 5.64
thursday 47.78 18197
£r iday 45.85 -1.93
thursday 43.93 19231
£r iday 45.93 2
t hursday 38.47 18632.5
£r iday 33.97 -4.6
thursday 41.9 18573
£r iday 44.91 3.01
thursday 49.89 18512
£r iday 46.9 -2.99
thursday 54.69 19951
£r iday 52.86 -1.83
thursday 32.18 19614
£r iday 27.15 -5.03
t hursday 31.4 19521
£r iday 41.81 10.41
TABLE IV. 2.3
Interbank
Rates
(CONTINUED)
Changes in 
Interbank 
Rates
Weekly Ml 
Announc.
thursday 41.94 19632
fr iday 44.8 2.86
tbursday 47.77 19872
£r Iday 47.93 0.16
t hursday 49.78 22139
£r iday 53.02 3.24
t hursday 53.7 21963
£r iday 54.87 1.17
t hursday 52.26 21133
£r iday 54.33 2.07
thursday 56.86 21292
£r iday 56.92 0.06
thursday 57.79 22500
£r iday 61.57 3.78
thursday 56.99 21566
£r iday 59.52 2.53
thursday 59.75 21557
£r iday 59.95 0.2
thursday 62.67 21963
£r iday 61.79 -0.88
thursday 62.29 23556
£r iday 62.86 0.57
thursday 58.75 22979
£r iday 58.2 -0.55
thursday 61.9 24653
£r iday 63.68 1.78
thursday 63.87 24845
£r iday 63.95 0.08
thursday 55.07 24059
£r iday 53.16 -1.91
thursday 52.05 25240
£r iday 50.07 -1.98
thursday 50.08 24679
£r iday 50.15 0.07
TABLE IV. 2.3
Interbank
Rates
(CONTINUED)
Changes in 
Interbank 
Rates
Weekly Ml 
Announc.
t bursday 48.16 24771
fr iday 48.87 0.71
t hursday 48.22 25341
fr iday 50.57 2.35
thursday 58.94 27104
fr iday 58.9 -0.04
thursday 56.67 26472
fr iday 56.78 0.11
t hursday 59.07 26238
fr iday 59.78 0.71
thursday 55.95 26050
fr iday 53.59 -2.36
thursday 55.36 26712
fr iday 56.39 1.03
thursday 55.21 26978
fr iday 52.16 -3.05
thursday 49.23 26842
fr iday 55.9 6.67
t hursday 53.02 26470
£r iday 51.06 -1.96
thursday 50.14 26809
fr iday 53.14 3
t hursday 52.53 27810
fr iday 50.19 -2.34
thursday 50.61 26819
fr iday 54.04 3.43
thursday 58.81 26488
fr iday 58.26 -0.55
thursday 59.82 26955
fr iday 59.66 -0.16
thursday 59.91 28192
fr iday 59.41 -0.5
TABLE IV.2. 3
Interbank
Rates
(CONTINUED)
Changes in 
Interbank 
Rates
Weekly Ml 
Announc.
thursday 59.86 26939
fr iday 59.83 -0.03
thursday 59.81 26389
fr iday 59.8 -0.01
thursday 59.78 26365
£r iday 58.17 -1.61
t hursday 62.93 26563
fr iday 62.96 0.03
thursday 64.94 27240
fr iday 64.92 -0.02
thursday 64.94 29326
fr iday 64.82 -0.12
thursday 59.23 29013
fr iday 59.13 -0.1
thursday 62.87 28066
fr iday 64.97 2.1
thursday 64.97 30507
fr iday 64.97 0
thursday 64.92 29533
fr iday 64.88 -0.04
thursday 64.92 29227
fr iday 64.92 0
thursday 64.93 28792
fr iday 64.96 0.03
thursday 68.95 30543
fr iday 68.96 0.01
thursday 68.86 29434
fr iday 68.75 -0.11
thursday 69.75 29314
friday 70.75 1
thursday 128.15 28137
fr iday 112.4 -15.75
thursday 125.07 30185
fr iday 147.39 22.32
TABLE IV. 2.3
Interbank
Rates
(CONTINUED)
Changes in 
Interbank 
Rates
Weekly Ml 
Announc.
thursday 60 29490
fr iday 72.29 12.29
thursday 115.49 28570
fr iday 111.73 -3.76
thursday 110.17 28188
fг iday 110 -0.17
thursday 115 32310
fr iday 120 5
thursday 120 31204
fr iday 120 0
thursday 97.11 29549
fr iday 96.63 -0.48
thursday 88.7 28776
fr iday 86.96 -1.74
thursday 81.99 29440
tr iday 80.67 -1.32
thursday 79.89 31368
fr iday 79.89 0
t hursday 77.86 30314
fr iday 77.88 0.02
thursday 76.82 30088
£r iday 75.36 -1.46
thursday 74.82 30502
fr iday 73.87 -0.95
thursday 69.62 31419
fr iday 70.78 1.16
thursday 70.83 34904
fr iday 70.9 0.07
thursday 69.96 33419
fr iday 68.21 -1.75
t hursday 67.77 31812
fr iday 67.77 0
TABLE IV. 2.3
Interbank
Rates
(CONTINUED)
Changes in 
Interbank 
Rat es
Weekly Ml 
Announc.
thursday 64.43 32579
fr iday 65.86 1.42
thursday 65.75 34362
fr iday 65.75 0
thursday 65.75 33445
fr iday 65.76 0
thursday 65.75 34078
fr iday 65.77 0.02
t hursday 61.05 34585
fr iday 60.04 -1.01
thursday 60.15 38174
fr iday 62.19 2.04
thursday 67.76 36357
fr iday 67.5 -0.25
thursday 67.84 35822
fr iday 0 -67.84
thursday 64.78 36401
fr iday 63.8 -0.98
thursday 61.9 37456
fr iday 61.92 0.02
thursday 61.84 39974
fr iday 61.8 -0.04
thursday 61.85 39430
fr iday 61.85 0
thursday 61.75 39127
£r iday 61.76 0
thursday 61.75 40148
fr iday 61.78 0.03
thursday 61.84 42534
fr iday 61.83 -0.01
thursday 61.91 40500
fr iday 61.87 -0.04
thursday 61.76 39353
fr iday 61.76 0
TABLE IV. 2.3
Interbank
Rates
(CONTINUED)
Changes in 
Interbank 
Rat es
Weekly Ml 
Announc.
thursday 61.75 38843
£r iday 61.75 0
t hursday 61.86 42459
fr iday 61.89 0.03
t hursday 61.75 39676
fr iday 61.75 0
t hursday 60.75 39038
fr iday 60.75 0
thursday 59.92 38675
fr iday 59.96 0.04
thursday 59.94 39598
fr iday 59.89 -0.05
thursday 59.91 41872
fr iday 59.9 -0.01
thursday 59.75 42116
fr iday 69.75 0
thursday 59.75 42533
fr iday 69.76 0
t hursday 69.75 39883
fr iday 69.75 0
thursday 60.75 43395
fr iday 60.75 0
thursday 60.75 41401
fr iday 60.75 0
thursday 60.76 39675
fr iday 60.76 0
thursday 61.75 40316
fr iday 62.76 1
thursday 62.76 42362
fr iday 63.75 1
thursday 63.78 43350
TABLE IV. 2.3
Interbank 
Rat es
(CONTINUED)
Changes in 
Interbank 
Rates
Weekly Ml 
Announc.
fr iday 63.75 -0.03
thursday 63.75 41902
fr iday 63.75 0
t hursday 63.75 43803
triday 63.75 0
t hursday 63.75 43572
fr iday 63.75 0
thursday 63.75 46656
£r iday 63.75 0
thursday 63.75 43716
fr iday 63.83 0.08
t hursday 63.75 46054
fr iday 63.75 0
t hursday 63.75 44057
fr iday 65.75 2
thursday 66.75 48118
fr iday 66.76 0.01
t hursday 66.75 46124
fr iday 66.75 0
thursday 66.75 46888
fr iday 66.75 0
thursday 67.75 44585
£r iday 67.75 0
t hursday 67.75 49705
triday 67.83 0.08
t hursday 67.83 46469
fr iday 67.75 -0.08
thursday 67.75 46807
triday 67.81 0.06
t hursday 68.82 50075
triday 68.92 0.1
thursday 68.98 57525
triday 68.97 -0.01
TAB L E  I V . 2.3 (CONTINUED)
Interbank
Rates
Changes in 
Interbank 
Rates
Weekly Ml 
Announc.
t hursday 68.75 53434
fr iday 68.76 0
thursday 68.25 50966
fr iday 67.66 -0.6
thursday 66.76 49436
fr iday 66.75 0
t hursday 66.77 49062
fr iday 66.97 0.2t hursday 66.76 56269
fr iday 66.76 0
thursday 66.75 54219
fr iday 66.38 -0.37
TABLE IV . 2.4
UNANTICIPATED MONEY SUPPLY (MISURP)
Week MISURP Week MISURP Week MISURP
1 2454.215 33 108.1504 65 68.49023
2 -1729.23 34 732.25 66 -14.6894
3 -1863.23 35 -162.180 67 82.58008
4 -150.645 36 -34.4101 68 -99.1503
5 -891.46 37 -1.21972 69 2040.539
6 -204.145 38 955.29 70 873.3496
7 28.60254 39 11.50977 71 -364.470
8 509.2148 40 380.1094 72 -98.0898
9 8.820314 41 22.14941 73 499.6406
10 48.58887 42 -325.859 74 -1045.67
11 315.5703 43 773.7188 75 -137.779
12 811.9805 44 -8.88085 76 374.8398
13 71.03027 45 -207.281 77 1316.631
14 -131.730 46 -43.5390 78 -115.710
15 51.31055 47 522.9492 79 1893.359
16 22.62988 48 -582.140 80 967.3008
17 241.5605 49 -141.310 81 -857.679
18 453.8594 50 -26.1894 82 756.0898
19 324.9404 51 868.7617 83 -550.320
20 139.6699 52 -203.728 84 -232.130
21 532.8203 53 2371.522 85 450
22 -197.160 54 -621.220 86 1779.551
23 -53.8603 55 -1020.19 87 42.51953
24 57.9707 56 474.4395 88 -196.960
25 571.0303 57 -1172.17 89 -525.880
26 -78.3007 58 -713 90 -9.63085
27 225.3096 59 -451.320 91 124.8203
28 310.04 60 716.4395 92 -21.2109
29 1461.069 61 -413.5 93 -418.070
30 127.5703 62 -287.310 94 -125.570
31 199.7695 63 -254.580 95 647.9004
32 59.73047 64 1071.449 96 -785.769
TABLE IV . 2.4 (CONTINUED)
UNANTICIPATED MONEY SUPPLY (MISURP)
Week MISURP Week MISURP Week MISURP
97 -585.390 129 208.5703 161 -1831.32
98 -32.6503 130 3798.08 162 -2600.51
99 794.3203 131 502.5 163 194.6484
100 -901.669 132 -879.859 164 814.5586
101 -734.580 133 122.4395 165 1043.789
102 -678.660 134 365.25 166 17.91016
103 -697.599 135 -800.128 167 2201.922
104 388.4395 136 1185.129 168 -381.808
105 2488.25 137 670.5313 169 2533.41
106 543.9609 138 3365.641 170 -1240.82
107 -526.679 139 -213.171 171 1804.699
108 2161.16 140 0.949218 172 -1496.02
109 -721.429 141 330.1914 173 2146.379
110 -353.220 142 -204.968 174 56.58984
111 -753.119 143 2727.84 175 87.87891
112 902.0606 144 1187.59 176 -1479.77
113 -734.820 145 522.4805 177 2723.078
114 -370.140 146 800.5703 178 -1400.85
115 -1539.14 147 1739.66 179 -929.128
116 844.5508 148 -1281 180 4338.66
117 -298.009 149 -895.039 181 7285
118 -1091.09 150 -1414.14 182 699.6914
119 -778.640 151 1643.262 183 -692.941
120 2987.721 152 -2228.69 184 -2534.98
121 381.6191 153 -435.929 185 -5569.66
122 -794.259 154 -691.898 186 6161.949
123 -1208.09 155 -1271.64 187 -45.3984
124 -1653.31 156 1736.828
125 1419.9 157 1899.262
126 -258.490 158 1653.699
127 107.9199 159 -2373.69
128 130.4492 160 1967.621
V.EMPIRIGAL RESULTS
A fte r runn ing  the o rig ina l regression equation described in 
ea rlie r part, resu lts  indicated high positive  autocorrelation 
Durbin Watson S ta t is t ic s  = 2.70. Cochrane-O rcutt technique was 
applied to elim inate autocorre lation and the second run resulted 
in a sa tis fac to ry  DurbinWatson S ta t is t ic  (2.0189) the resu lt of 
th is  regression  is g iven below;
R^  = 2.5556 -  6.452E-058*(M1FRC)^- 1.872E-05*(MISURP)^
(3.1158) (-2.3127) (-0.0605)
The tabulated resu lts  are given at Table V.1.1. The 
unantic ipated component is s ig n if ican t in the changes in in terbank 
rates at both 95% and 90% s ign ificance  leve ls. Accord ing to th is  
resu lt, the null hypothesis of a^  = 0 -  the basic hypothesis of 
market e ffic iency  -  is rejected. Antic ipated Ml values are 
e ffective  on TL in terbank rate. Th is destroys the market 
e ffic iency  in TL in terbank market.
Moreover the null hypothesis that the coeffic ient of 
unantic ipated component, is zero cannot be rejected which is 
another ind ication of market ine ffic iency. Market does not respond 
to monetary su rp rise .
Empirical resu lts  concluded tha t TL in terbank market in 
Tu rkey  is an ine ffic ien t financia l market. Indeed th is  is not a 
su rp r is e  in the presence of ind ica to rs po inting in competitiveness 
of th is  market because of high Central Bank in tervention.
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RESULT OF ECONOMETRIC MODEL 
Summary Statistics
TAB L E  V.1.1
Equat i on CHINT= aO+al*(MlFRC)+a2*(MlSURP)
2
aO al a2 D-W
2.6556746 -6.452E-06 -1.872E-06 0.136 2.018993
(3.1168) (-2.3127) (-0.0605)
CHINT :
MIFRC 
MISURP : 
2
R :
D-W :
Change in TL interbank rate from before to 
after the announcement (fri.avg-thr.avg)
Anticipated money supply
Unanticipated money supply
R-squared value of regression 
Durban Watson Statistic
Note t-statistics are givenin parentheses
Let’s make a broader in terpre tation  on these resu lts. Indeed 
there  are few well function ing  in terbank money markets in 
developing countries. But e ffic ien t monetary policy implementation 
and domestic resource allocation necessitate in terbank borrowing 
and lending. Without an e ffic ien t way of lending among 
themselves, banks may be affected d iffe ren tly  by the same monetary 
policy measure. The speed of responses to monetary policy actions 
may also depend in part on the e ffic iency  of the in terbank money 
market. Reasons fo r nondevelopment include (a) Taxation of all 
financia l transactions, making ve ry  sho rt term overn igh t borrow ing 
and lending, to ta lly  uneconomical (b) The d iscount fa c ilit ie s  of 
Central Bank that p rovide  inexpensive and unlim ited loans to banks 
in need of funds (c) In terest rate ce iling  tha t p revent banks from 
negotiating terms of in terbank loans (d) In su ffic ien t penalties 
fo r sh o rtfa lls  in requ ired reserves.
In terbank market is a newly emerging market in Turkey and 
banks have not been yet accustomed to th is  kind of transactions 
although partic ipation  increases. Bankers regard borrow ing from 
another bank as a s ign of weakness.
Central Bank in tervention  to th is  market is h igh ly  resulted 
from the fact that the market fo r open market operations is also 
new and in su ffic ien t alone to ad ju st liq u id ity . So Central Bank 
p re fe rs  to use both open market operations and in terbank market 
together fo r its  monetary po licy ends. Its contro ls interbank 
rates t ig h t ly .
* For 182 degrees of freedom the critical t-values are 1.645 and 
1.282 for 95*/ and 905< significance levels respectively.
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In T u rk ish  banking system, besides reserve requirement fo r 
banks Centrai Bank ob iigates them to hoid extra iiq u id ity  (in 
Turkey it is caiied d isponab iiity  ratio). Banks hoid it as bond 
portfo iio . Money supp iy  announcements have not much effect since 
the choices of banks to provide  th e ir  reserve  requirements are 
iimited due to the iack of second hand bond market in Turkey.
Centrai Bank is not independent s ince it is obiigated to 
g ive  government domestic debt. The poiitica i a ttitudes affect 
Centrai Bank poiic ies a iot and fo rce  Centrai Bank to go out of 
its  monetary ta rge ts fo r the sake of meeting its  obiigation to 
government. Th is makes Centrai Bank poiic ies unpred ictab ie  even to 
it se if. Hardouveiis (1984) points out two main hypothesis that 
have been advanced in the iite ra tu re  to expiain reaction of short 
term in te rest rates. They d iffe r  in th e ir  in te rpre tation  of the 
informationai content of the unanticipated component of M l. The 
f ir s t  hypothesis presumes tha t markets perce ive the unanticipated 
shock in Ml as a pe rs is ten t money demand shock. Under th is  
hypothesis money supp iy  shocks are perceived as temporary because 
the monetary au tho rity  has c re d ib iiity  i.e. market expects Centrai 
Bank to s t ick  to its Ml ta rge ts  and not aiiow pe rs is ten t 
deviations from these targets. A pe rs is ten t positive  money demand 
shock tha t wiii not be vaiidated, together with the assumption 
tha t p rices are r ig id  in the sho rt run ieads market partic ipan ts 
to expect an increase in fu tu re  rpai sho rt term in te rest rates. 
Th is d r ive s  reai sho rt term in te rest rates up immediateiy after 
the announcement. Th is is caiied the "expected iiqu idy  
hypothesis".
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The second hypothesis presumes that the unanticipated 
component of M1 is in terpreted as a pe rs is ten t shock on the growth 
rate of the money supp iy . The Central Bank lacks c red ib ility  in 
the market, i.e. markets do not expect the centra l bank to 
counteract a shock in the banking system that affects the growth 
rate of the money supp ly . This, together with the assumption that 
p rices are flex ib le  in the sho rt run, leads to a change in the 
in flation premium embodied in sho rt -term  in te rest rates. Th is is 
the "in fla tion  premium hypothesis".
In Turkey, it is most like ly  that market pa rtic ipan ts do 
not believe in the c re d ib ility  of Central Bank since the actions 
of Central Bank seem to depend h igh ly  on politica l considerations 
and is not understand able and easily  pred ictab le. The movements 
of Central Bank is h igh ly  complicated and su rp r is in g  to the 
market.
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VI. CONCLUSION
In th is  s tudy , I have tested the e ffic iency  of TL interbank 
market with respect to narrow iy defined money supp iy 
announcements. In an e ffic ien t market, it is expected that oniy 
the unanticipated component of money supp iy  announcements is 
e ffective  on changes in in terbank rates. In other words, rates 
respond on iy to monetary su rp rise s , in a way which cor recti y 
incorporates the poiicy ru ie  in operation.
Considering the Tu rk ish  case the TL in terbank faiied to be 
an e ffic ien t market as a resu it o f my empiricai study, since 
unanticipated component resu lted to be s ign if ican t on the changes 
in in te rest rates. There are several reasons fo r that resu lt 
mainly high Central Bank in tervention  to the market, so th is  
becomes a source o f a rb itrage. Moreover, as a newly emerging 
market, TL in terbank market has several s tru c tu ra l defic iencies 
causing ine ffic iency  such as t ig h t ce ilin g s on in terbank rates.
In o rde r to achieve better u tiliza tion  of our financia l 
system, in terbank market must function  in an e ffic ien t manner.
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Summary of fitted Model fors BslNlTHl.VARO
Param eter E st im a te S t n d .e r r o r T -v a lu e P -v a lu e
AR ( 1) .0 3454 .1 44 52 .23899 .8 1213
MEAN 4 5 .5 2 3 5 5 39 .48409 1 .1 5 2 9 6 .25464
CONSTANT 4 3 .9 5 1 2 2
Model f i t t e d  t o  d i f f e r e n c e s  o f  o r d e r  1
E st im ated  w h ite  n o i s e  v a r ia n c e  = 7 2 7 7 0 .9  w ith  48 d e g re e s  o f  freedom .
E st im ated  w h ite  n o i s e  s ta n d a rd  d e v i a t i o n  ( s t d  e r r )  = 269 .761  
C h i - s i u a r e  t e s t  s t a t i s t i c  on f i r s t  20 r e s id u a l  a u t o c o r r e l a t i o n s  = 101 .32 6  
w ith  p r o b a b i l i t y  o f  a l a r g e r  v a lu e  g iv e n  w h ite  n o is e  = 3 .07865E -13  
B a c k fo r e c a s t i n g !  no Number o f  i t e r a t i o n s  per fo rm ed ! 1
Summary o f  f i t t e d  Model f o r :  BsiNITMl.VARO
Parameter E st im ate S t n d .e r r o r T -v a lu e P -v a lu e
AR ( 1 ) .05761 .1 28 38 .4 4 8 7 3 .65569
AR ( 2 ) - .4 9 0 6 4 .1 3 1 7 9 - 3 .7 2 2 7 9 .00053
MEAN 4 3 .5 1 8 8 7 2 3 .9 7 3 2 6 1 .81531 .07586
CONSTANT 62 .36401
Model f i t t e d  t o  d i f f e r e n c e s  o f  o r d e r  1
E st im ated  w h ite  n o i s e  v a r ia n c e  * 57292 .1  w ith  47 d e g r e e s  o f  freedom .
E st im ated  w h ite  n o i s e  s ta n d a rd  d e v i a t i o n  ( s t d  e r r )  = 239 .35 8  
C h i-s q u a r e  t e s t  s t a t i s t i c  on f i r s t  20 r e s id u a l  a u t o c o r r e l a t i o n s  = 33 .2 71 6  
w ith  p r o b a b i l i t y  o f  a l a r g e r  v a lu e  g iv e n  w h ite  n o i s e  »  0 .0 1 5 4 7 0 9  
B a c k f o r e c a s t i n g !  no Number o f  i t e r a t i o n s  p er form ed ! 2
4 1 .8 0 4 3
F i n a l !  SSS = i ,8 5 5 2 3 E 6  s to p p e d  on c r i t e r i o n  2
Summary o f  F i t t e d  Mode) for<  B!INITMI.OAKO
Parameter E st im a te S t n d .e r r o r T -v a lu e P -v a lu e
Ak ( 1) .22046 .03906 5 .64 47 0 .00000
AB ( 2) -1 .0 1 8 8 1 .03939 -2 5 .8 6 6 1 6 .00000
MA ( 1) .2 45 77 .15695 1 .56 59 0 .12454
MA ( 2) - .8 8 5 6 6 .1 21 22 - 7 .3 0 6 2 0 .00000
MA ( 3) .08713 .1 6 1 6 8 .5 3889 .59268
MEAN 4 1 .8 3 7 5 7 2 4 .7 58 2 0 1 .6 8 9 8 5 .09813
CONSTANT 75 .2 38 6 3
Model f i t t e d  t o  d i f f e r e n c e s  o f  o r d e r  1
E st im ated  w h ite  n o i s e  v a r ia n c e  -  4 2 1 6 4 .4  w ith  44 d e g r e e s  o f  freedom .
E st im ated  w h ite  n o i s e  s ta n d a rd  d e v i a t i o n  ( s t d  e r r )  = 2 05 .34  
C h i- s q u a r e  t e s t  s t a t i s t i c  on f i r s t  20 r e s id u a l  a u t o c o r r e l a t i o n s  = 1 3 .1005  
w ith  p r o b a b i l i t y  o f  a l a r g e r  v a lu e  g iv e n  w h ite  n o i s e  = 0 .5 9 4 5 3 2  
B a c k fo r e c a s t i n g !  no Number o f  i t e r a t i o n s  perform ed !
Summary o f  F i t t e d  Model f o r !  BUNITMl.VAKO
Param eter E st im a te S t n d .e r r o r T -v a lu e P -v a lu e
AR < 1 ) - .2 7 6 4 1 1 .32921 - .2 0 7 9 5 .8 3625
AB ( 2) - .9 0 3 7 9 .28333 -3 .1 8 9 8 7 .0 0266
AB < 3) - .5 1 0 0 9 1 .33 96 0 - .3 8 0 7 8 .70524
MA ( 1) - .2 3 2 7 0 1 .3 7 1 3 2 - .1 6 9 6 9 .86605
MA ( 2) - .7 8 1 5 3 .32855 - 2 .3 7 8 7 5 .02188
MA ( 3) - .3 3 2 4 6 1 .21 79 6 - .2 7 2 9 6 .78619
MEAN 4 1 .6 9 3 4 4 25 .59266 1 .6 2 9 1 2 .11059
CONSTANT 112 .16 7 48
Model f i t t e d  t o  d i f f e r e n c e s  o f  o r d e r  1
E st im ated  w h ite  n o i s e  v a r ia n c e  -  4 2 7 9 7 .5  w ith  43 d e g r e e s  o f  freedom .
E st im ated  w h ite  n o i s e  s ta n d a rd  d e v i a t i o n  ( s t d  e r r )  *  206 .87 6  
C h i- s q u a r e  t e s t  s t a t i s t i c  on f i r s t  20 r e s i d u a l  a u t o c o r r e l a t i o n s  »  12 .1287  
w ith  p r o b a b i l i t y  o f  a l a r g e r  v a lu e  g iv e n  w h ite  n o i s e  = 0 .5 9 5 9 6 7  
B a c k f o r e c a s t i n g !  no Number o f  i t e r a t i o n s  p e r fo rm ed !rfw
Summary of F it te d  Model for·: B siN IT M l.VARO
Param eter E st im a te S t n d .e r r o r T -v a lu e P -v a lu e
AS ( 1) - .1 0 5 4 3 1 .38 28 5 - .0 7 6 2 4 . 93959
AP < 2) - .8 3 7 3 4 . 25385 - 3 .2 9 8 5 8 .00199
AB ( 3) - .3 6 7 2 5 1 .3 8 0 5 8 - .2 6 6 0 1 .7 9153
AB ( 4 ) .1 0 1 7 7 . 22090 .46069 .64740
MA ( 1 ) - .0 8 1 2 4 1 .38 15 2 - .0 5 8 8 0 .95339
MA ( 2) - .7 6 6 7 6 .3 07 58 - 2 .4 9 2 8 5 .01670
MA ( 3) - .2 3 4 9 6 1 .22701 - .1 9 1 4 9 ,84906
MEAN 41.2 99 8 1 2 7 .7 94 0 7 1 .4 8 5 9 2 .14477
CONSTANT 9 1 .2 00 2 0
Model f i t t e d  t o  d i f f e r e n c e s  o f  o r d e r  1
E st im ated  w h ite  n o i s e v a r ia n c e 4 3 6 4 7 .5  w ith  42 d e g r e e s o f freedom .
E st im ated  w h ite  n o i s e s ta n d a rd  d e v i a t i o n  ( s t d e r r )  * 208. 92
C h i- s q u a r e  t e s t  s t a t i s t i c  on f i r s t  20 r e s id u a l a u t o c o r r e l a t i o n s  = 12.0994
w ith  p r o b a b i l i t y o f  a l a r g e r v a lu e  g iv e n w h ite  n o is e 0 .51 95 0 8
B a c B fo r e c a s t i n g :  no Number o f i t e r a t i o n s  performed·· 8
Summary o f  F i t t e d  Model f o r ! BlINlTMl.VABO
Parameter E st im a te S t n d .e r r o r T -v a lu e P '-value
AB ( 1) - .4 4 1 8 7 .72501 - .6 0 9 4 6 .54550
AB ( 2) - .8 5 9 4 9 .1 5 4 2 0 - 5 .5 7 3 7 5 .00000
AB ( 3) - .6 8 8 4 2 .7 32 40 - .9 3 9 9 5 .35262
MA ( 1) - .4 2 0 1 2 .7 2954 - .5 7 5 8 6 .56778
MA ( 2) - .7 6 9 0 1 .2 7488 -2 .7 9 7 6 4 .00774
MA < 3) - .5 1 3 3 0 .6 69 56 - .7 6 6 6 3 .44759
MA ( 4 ) - .0 5 2 9 5 .1 8600 - .2 8 4 6 7 . 77729
MEAN 4 1 .3 7 5 9 5 2 7 .2 9 4 9 3 1 .51 58 8 .13704
CONSTANT 1 23 .7 0 4 8 8
Model f i t t e d  t o  d i f f e r e n c e s  o f  o r d e r  1
E st im ated  w h ite  n o i s e  v a r ia n c e  = 4 3 6 4 0 .7  w ith  42 d e y re e s  o f  freedom .
E st im ated  w h ite  n o i s e  s ta n d a rd  d e v i a t i o n  ( s t d  e r r )  = 208 .904  
C h i-s q u a r e  t e s t  s t a t i s t i c  on f i r s t  20 r e s i d u a l  a u t o c o r r e l a t i o n s  = 1 1 .7 7 5  
w ith  p r o b a b i l i t y  o f  a l a r g e r  v a lu e  g iv e n  w h ite  n o i s e  * 0 .5 4 6 1 7 9  
B a c b f o r e c a s t i n g !  no Number o f  i t e r a t i o n s  perform edt 9
Iteration 5t FSS = 1.88831E6 
Iterat ion  6: RSS = 1.86324E6 
Final! ESS = 1.86272E6
b * 0 .236701  - i . 01111 0 .2 2 8 5 2 6  -0 .8 8 5 0 4 3  4 1 .1 80 7  
b = 0 .2 3 3 3 8 4  -1 .0 1 8 7 7  0 .21 69 7 4  -0 .8 56 2 31  4 1 .4 86 2  
. . . s t o p p e d  on c r i t e r i o n  2
Summary o f  F i t t e d  Model f o r !  BMNITMl.VARO
Parameter E st im ate S t n d .e r r o r T -v a lu e P -v a lu e
AR ( 1) .23440 .03551 6 .6 0 0 8 9 .00000
AR < 2> -1 .0 2 3 4 6 .0 3 6 6 3 -2 7 .9 3 9 2 8 .00000
MA ( 1) .2 1 6 1 3 .1 08 43 1 .99331 .05231
MA ( 2) - .8 6 7 6 5 .11221 -7 .7 3 2 0 8 .00000
MEAN 4 1 .2 7 5 3 9 2 6 .4 78 2 5 1 .55884 .12604
CONSTANT 73 .8 44 3 0
Model f i t t e d  t o  d i f f e r e n c e s  o f  o r d e r  1
E st im ated  w h ite  n o i s e  v a r ia n c e  = 4 1 3 9 3 .8  w ith  45 d e g re e s  o f  freedom .
E st im a ted  w h ite  n o i s e  s ta n d a rd  d e v i a t i o n  ( s t d  e r r )   ^ 203 .45 5  
C h i-sq u a r e  t e s t  s t a t i s t i c  on f i r s t  20 r e s id u a l  a u t o c o r r e l a t i o n s  = 14 .8 84 6  
w ith  p r o b a b i l i t y  o f  a l a r g e r  va lu e  g iv e n  w h ite  n o i s e  = 0 .53 31 0 7  
B a c k f o r e c a s t i n g !  no Number o f  i t e r a t i o n s  perform ed !
11 4 2 .0 4 6 3
F i n a l ! RSS = 1.85431E6 . . . s t o p p e d  on c r i t e r i o n  2
Summary o f  F i t t e d  Model f o r ! BîlNITMl.VARO
Parameter E st im ate S t n d .e r r o r T -v a lu e P -v a lu e
AR ( 1) .09694 .21279 .4 55 55 .65095
AR ( 2) - .9 9 2 6 7 .0 7 1 2 5 -1 3 .9 3 2 7 3 .00000
AR ( 3) - .1 2 1 5 2 .1 95 50 - .6 2 1 5 6 .53744
MA < 1 ) .1 27 12 .16361 .7 76 94 .4 4135
MA ( 2) - .8 7 9 3 9 .1 33 56 -6 .5 8 4 3 6 .0 0000
MEAN 4 2 .0 7 0 7 2 2 4 .8 98 7 9 1 .68 96 7 .09817
CONSTANT 84 .8 67 1 6
Model f i t t e d  t o  d i f f e r e n c e s  o f  o r d e r  1
E st im a ted  w h ite  n o i s e  v a r ia n c e  * 4 2 1 4 3 .4  w ith  44 d e g r e e s  o f  freedom .
E st im a ted  w h ite  n o i s e  s ta n d a rd  d e v i a t i o n  ( s t d  e r r )  = 205 .28 9  
C h i - s q u a r e  t e s t  s t a t i s t i c  on f i r s t  20 r e s id u a l  a u t o c o r r e l a t i o n s  * 12 .6151  
w ith  p r o b a b i l i t y  o f  a l a r g e r  va lu e  g iv e n  w h ite  n o i s e  * 0 .6 3 2  
f i a c k f o r e c a s t in g !  no Number o f  i t e r a t i o n s  per fo rm ed ! 8
11 42.0463
F in a l i RSS = 1 . 85431E6 . . . s t o p p e d  on c r i t e r i o n  2
Summary o f  F i t t e d  Model f o r ! BÜNITM1. VARO
Parameter E st im ate S t n d .e r r o r T -v a lu e P -v a lu e
AR ( 1) .0 9694 .2 12 79 .45555 .65095
AR < 2) - .9 9 2 6 7 .0 71 25 -1 3 .9 3 2 7 3 ,00000
AR < 3) - .1 2 1 5 2 .1 95 50 - .6 2 1 5 6 .53744
MA ( 1) .1 27 12 .16361 .77694 .44135
MA ( 2) - .8 7 9 3 9 .1 33 56 -6 .5 8 4 3 6 .00000
MEAN 4 2 .0 7 0 7 2 24 .8 98 7 9 1 .68 96 7 .09817
CONSTANT 84 .8 67 1 6
Model f i t t e d  t o  d i f f e r e n c e s  o f  o rd e r  1
E st im a ted  w h ite  n o i s e  v a r ia n c e  = 4 2 1 4 3 ,4  w ith  44 d e g r e e s  o f  freedom .
E st im a ted  w hite  n o i s e  s ta n d a rd  d e v i a t i o n  ( s t d  e r r )  = 2 05 .289  
C h i -S iu a r e  t e s t  s t a t i s t i c  on f i r s t  20 r e s id u a l  a u t o c o r r e l a t i o n s  = 12.6151  
w ith  p r o b a b i l i t y  o f  a l a r g e r  v a lu e  g iv e n  w h ite  n o i s e  ® 0 .6 3 2  
B a c lr fo r e c a s t in g !  no Number o f  i t e r a t i o n s  per fo rm ed ! 8
Fesi dual Summary
Number o f  o b s e r v a t i o n s  »  50 
R esid ua l  avera ge  = 1 .5 2 2 9 2  
R esid ua l  v a r ia n c e  = 4 2 1 4 3 .4  
R esidua l  s ta n d a rd  e r r o r  = 2 05 .2 8 9
C o e f f ,  o f  skewness = 0 .5 2 5 6 4 7  
C o e f f ,  o f  k u r t o s i s  * 0 ,8 6 7 7 3 4
s t a n d a r d iz e d  v a lu e  = 1 .51741  
s t a n d a r d iz e d  v a lu e  «  1 .2 5 2 4 7
Actual and Anticipated Differences in M
* Weekly data covering first
5S observations in 1988 DM! — -DMIFRC
Actual and Anticipated Differences in Mi
" Weekly data covering second
52 observations in 1989 DM1 ___ DMIPRC J
i\.ctiial and Anticipated differences in Mi
* Weekly data covering third
52 observations D m  ___ DMIFRC
Actual and Anticipated Differences in Ml
* Weekly data covering last
25 observations ,DM1 ___ DMIPRC
